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Abstract
We show that intermediate goods can be sourced to ﬁrms on the “outside” (that do not
compete in the ﬁnal product market), even when there are no economies of scale or cost
advantages for these ﬁrms. What drives the phenomenon is that “inside” ﬁrms, by accepting
such orders, incur the disadvantage of becoming Stackelberg followers in the ensuing com-
petition to sell the ﬁnal product. Thus they have incentive to quote high provider prices to
ward off future competitors, driving the latter to source outside.
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11 Introduction
One of the principal concerns of any ﬁrm is to conﬁgure the supply of intermediate goods
essential to its production. Of late, with the liberalization of trade and the lowering of barri-
ers to entry, supply chain conﬁgurations have assumed global proportions. Indeed, in several
industries, it has become the trend for ﬁrms to cut across national boundaries and outsource
their supplies “offshore”, provided the economic lure is strong enough. Many diverse fac-
tors inﬂuence ﬁrms’ decisions. First, of course, there is the immediate cost of procuring the
goods which—other things being equal—ﬁrms invariably seek to minimize. Then there is
the question of risk: a ﬁrm may be unwilling to commit itself to a single party and instead
spread its orders among others, even if they happen to be costlier, in order to ensure a steady
ﬂow of inputs. Sometimes a ﬁrm may tie up with a broad spectrum of suppliers so as to
increase its access to the latest technological innovation, which could be forthcoming from
any one of them. There can arise situations when a ﬁrm is impelled to select suppliers that
will be strategic allies in its endeavor to penetrate newly emerging markets. For the analyses
of these and other factors, and howthey impinge on ﬁrms’ decisions, see, e.g., Jarillo (1993),
Spiegel (1993), Vidal and Goetschalkx (1997), Domberger (1998), Aggarwal (2003), Shy
and Stenbacka (2003), Chen et al. (2004).
One intriguing possibility that has been alluded to, but not much explored, is that strate-
gic incentives may arise in an oligopoly which outweigh other considerations and play the
pivotal role in ﬁrms’ selection of suppliers. Instances of this are presented by Jarillo and
Domberger, of which we recount only two.
The ﬁrst case comes from Germany. AEG1 used to be a traditional supplier to both
BMW2 and Mercedes Benz. At some point, with a view to vertical integration, Mercedes
BenzacquiredAEG.ThiscausedBMWtolookforadifferentsupplier, despitetheinevitable
extra costs of the switch (see p. 67, Jarillo, 1993).
The second case involves General Electric (GE) in the United States. In the early 1980’s,
GE investigated the possibility of outsourcing its lower brand microwave ovens from out-
side, since these had become too costly to manufacture at its factory in Maryland. Discus-
sions were ﬁrst held with, and even trial orders given to, Matsushita which happened to
be a major rival of GE and also the world leader for this product in terms of both volume
and technology. But ultimately GE turned to Samsung, then a small company with little
experience in microwaves. The strategy entailed additional costs, such as sending American
engineers to Korea, but it worked well for GE (see, pp. 84-86, Jarillo, 1993; and also Case
Study 6.2, p. 108, Domberger, 1998).
Such case studies clearly point to the need for a game-theoretic analysis. In this paper
we bring to light a scenario in which the outsourcing patterns emerge out of the strategic
competition between ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that it is typically not the case that a ﬁrm will outsource
supplies to its rivals. There are two distinct reasons for this. The ﬁrst is based on increasing
returns to scale: if a ﬁrm places a sizeable order with its rival, it signiﬁcantly lowers the
rival’s costs on account of the increasing returns, and this stands to its detriment in the
ensuing competition on the ﬁnal product. Thus the ﬁrm is led to outsource to others who
1Allgemeine Deutsche Electricit¨ atsgesellschaft
2Bayerische Motoren Werke (or, Bavarian Motor Works)
2may be costlier but, being out of the ﬁnal product market, do not pose the threat of future
competition. The second reason is more subtle and persists even in the case of constant
returns to scale (i.e., linear costs)—indeed, it comes to the fore in this case. It is the main
focus of this paper.
To be precise, suppose there are many ﬁrms N competing in the market for a ﬁnal
product ®: Intermediate goods ´ are critical to the production of ®; but only some of the
ﬁrms I ½ N have the competence to manufacture ´ at reasonable cost. The other ﬁrms
J ´ NnI must obtain ´ from elsewhere. One possibility is to outsource ´ to their rivals
in I: But there is also a fringe of ﬁrms O on the “outside” which can manufacture ´. What
distinguishes O from I is that no ﬁrm in O can enter the market for the ﬁnal product ®.
(This could be because it lacks the technology to convert ´ to ®, or else faces high set-up
costs—and, possibly, other barriers to entry—in the market ®:3) To keep matters simple, we
consider a purely linear model, i.e., in which the costs of production for both ´ and ® are
linear; as is the market demand for ®.
Our main result is that, in this scenario, strategic considerations can come into play that
will cause the ﬁrms in J to outsource ´ (outside) to O rather than (inside) to I, even if the
costs of manufacturing ´ are higher in O than in I, so long as they are not much higher.
The intuition goes roughly as follows and is best seen with just three ﬁrms. Suppose (i)
I and J are Cournot duopolists which compete in the market for the ﬁnal product ®; (ii)
I and O can produce the intermediate good ´; but J cannot; and (iii) O cannot enter the
market for ®. Thus J is confronted with the decision of how much ´ to outsource to I and
how much to O, all of which it will convert to ®. It turns out that the optimal course of
action for J is to outsource exclusively to either I or O, never to both. Now if J outsources
to I, then I immediately knows the amount outsourced. This has the effect of establishing
J as leader in the Stackelberg game that ensues in the market for ®, in which I is forced to
become the follower. In contrast, if J outsources to O then—thanks to the sanctity of the
secrecy clause4—I will only know that J has struck a deal with O but not the quantity that
J has ousourced. Thus I and J will remain Cournot duopolists in the ensuing game on
market ®.
If costs for manufacturing´ do not vary too much betweenI and O, then I will earn less
as a Stackelberg follower than as a Cournot duopolist. This will tempt I to push J towards
O by quoting so high a price for the intermediate good ´ that, in spite of the premium that J
is willing to pay for the privilege of being the leader, J prefers to go to O. The temptation
can only be resisted if it is feasible for I to provide ´ at such an exorbitant price that it can
recoup as provider what it loses as follower. But such an exorbitant price can be undercut
by O, as long as O’s costs are not too much higher than I’s. The upshot is that in any
3In particular, think of the following set-up. The market for ® is concentrated in the “developed world”.
The ﬁrms in O; on the other hand, are located offshore in the “developing world” and can manufacture ´ but
lack the (advanced) technology for converting ´ to ®. Even if some of them were to make the technological
breakthrough, they would face not just the standard set-up costs for penetrating the market ®, but further barriers
to entry that pertain to foreign ﬁrms. This international setting perhaps makes our hypothesis of an outside fringe
O more viable. But we do not need it, and all we formally postulate is the existence of this fringe.
4The secrecy clause is crucial to our analysis. It can be upheld on the simple ground that it is routinely seen
in practice (see, e.g., Ravenhill, 2003; Clarkslegal and Kochhar, 2005). But, as we argue in Section 6, there are
a variety of settings in which it can be shown to hold endogenously in equilibrium.
3subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium5 (SPNE) of the game, J will outsource to O.
To complete the intuitive argument, we must still show that J’s outsourcing orders will
be exclusive. If J intends to produce no more than its Cournot quantity of ®, then its rival
I’s output of ® is invariant of who J outsources ´ to, and so J would do best to outsource
´ from whichever of I or O is charging the lower price. On the other hand, if J intends to
produce more than its Cournot quantity, then it is best for J to fully take advantage of its
leadership and outsource the Stackelberg amount to I.
The actual argument is more intricate and the exact result is presented in Section 3. As
was said, there are no economies of scale or cost advantages for the outside ﬁrm O: In fact,
we suppose that O has a higher cost than I for manufacturing ´. Our main result states that,
if O’s cost does not exceed a well-deﬁned threshold, J will outsource to O in any SPNE.
Worthy of note is the fact that it is not J who has the “primary” strategic incentive to
outsource to O. This incentive resides with I who is anxious to ward off J and force J to
turn to O. The anxiety gets played out when O does not have a severe cost disadvantage
compared to I. Otherwise, I is happy to strike a deal with J since it can get high provider
prices that compensate it for becoming a follower. Which subgame gets played between I
and J on market ®—Cournot or Stackelberg—is thus not apriori ﬁxed, but endogenous to
equilibrium. This is all the more striking since, in our overall game, the option is open for
ﬁrm J to outsource to both I and O and to thus bring any “mixture” of the Stackelberg and
Cournot games into play. The logic of the SPNE rules out mixing and shows that only one
of the two pure games will occur along the equilibrium play.
It should also be mentioned that our game involves simultaneous moves at various junc-
tures, ﬁrst at the very start, when ﬁrms I and O independently quote prices at which they
are willing to supply ´, and later in those subgames which follow after J’s decision to out-
source positive amounts of ´ to O. Thus we are far from having perfect information in our
game, and it is not a priori clear that SPNE will even exist in pure strategies. We prove that,
in fact, there is a continuum of pure strategy SPNE, across which the outputs of the ﬁrms
differ, but the outsourcing pattern is nevertheless invariant.
Economies of scale can easily be incorporated into our model. But then, as was said,
a new strategic consideration arises, though it does not affect the tenor of our results (see
Section 5.1 and, for full details, Chen & Dubey, 2005). The primary strategic incentive to
outsource to O can shift from I to J: For now J must worry that if it outsources ´ to I,
then I will develop a cost advantage on account of economies of scale. In other words,
I will be able to manufacture ´ for itself at an average cost that is signiﬁcantly lower than
what it charges to J. This might outweigh any leadership advantage thatJ obtains by going
to I. So, foreseeing a competitor in I that is ﬁerce inspite of being a follower, J would
prefer to outsource to O as long as O’s price is not too much above I’s. This, in turn, will
happen if O’s costs are not signiﬁcantly higher than I’s. But then, if J is outsourcing to O,
economies of scale can drive I to outsource to O as well!
These two strategic considerations, the ﬁrst impelling I to push J towards O and the
second impelling J to turn away from I on its own and to seek out O, are intermingled in
thepresenceofeconomiesofscale. Itishardtodisentanglethemandsaypreciselywhenone
5Throughout we conﬁne ourselves to pure strategies.
4fades out, leaving spotlight on the other. But by eliminating economies of scale altogether,
we are here able to focus on just the ﬁrst scenario, wherein the game turns essentially on the
informational content of the strategies.
Our analysis indicates that ﬁrms which position themselves on the “outside”, by not
entering the market for the ﬁnal product, are more likely to attract orders for intermediate
goods. There is some evidence that this can happen in practice. By the mid-1980’s (see
Ravenhill, 2003), US companies in the electronics industry were looking “to diversify their
sources of supply” in order to fare better against their Japanese competitors. Malaysia and
SingaporemadeastrongbidtogettheUSbusiness. Akeyfeatureofthegovernmentpolicies
of both nations was that “they were not attempting to promote national champions in the
electronic industry”, but the objective was rather “to build a complementary supply base,
not to create local rivals that might displace foreign producers”. Their success in becoming
major supply hubs for electronic components is well documented. Of course it is true that
they had the advantage of low-cost skilled labor. But what we wish to underscore is their
deliberate and well-publicized abstention from markets for the ﬁnal products. According
to our analysis, the abstention by itself gave Malaysia and Singapore a competitive edge:
even if their costs were to rise and exceed those in Japan, US ﬁrms would still favor them as
suppliers, since the Japanese ﬁrms are entrenched rivals on the ﬁnal product.
In conclusion, let us mention that there is considerable literature on endogenous Stack-
elberg leadership.6 The paper most closely related to ours,7 and inviting immediate compar-
ison, is Baake, Oechssler and Schenk (1999). They consider a duopoly model to examine
what they call “cross-supplies” within an industry—in our parlance, this is the phenomenon
that a ﬁrm outsources to its rival. The “endogenous Stackelberg effect” is indeed pointed out
by them: ﬁrm A, upon accepting the order outsourced by its rival B, automatically becomes
a Stackelberg follower in the ensuing game on the ﬁnal markets. But there are set-up costs
of production in their model, and provided these costs are high enough, A can charge B
a sufﬁciently high price so as to be compensated for being a follower. The upshot is that
cross-supplies can be sustained in SPNE.
There are several points of difference between their model and ours. First, their argu-
ment relies crucially on the presence of sufﬁciently strong economies of scale (set-up costs).
If these are absent or weak, there is no outsourcing in SPNE in their model. In contrast,
in our model, outsourcing occurs purely on account of the endogenous Stackelberg effect
(recall that we have constant returns to scale8). Second, outsourcing occurs only in some
of their SPNE: there always coexist other SPNE where it does not occur. In our model, the
outsourcing is invariant across all SPNE. In short, they show that outsourcing can occur,
while we show that it must. Third, it is critical for their result that there be no outside sup-
pliers.9 Such suppliers would generate competition that would make it infeasible for A to
charge a high price to B, invalidating their result. In our model, the situation is different.
We allow for both kinds of suppliers: those that are inside as potential rivals and others that
6E.g., Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), Robson (1990), Mailath (1993), Pal (1993), van Damme and Hurkens
(1999)—in all of which the timing of entry by ﬁrms is viewed as strategic.
7We are grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing it to our attention
8Though, as was said, outsourcing is further boosted by economies of scale in our model.
9Recall that these are suppliers who are not present as rivals in the ﬁnal product market.
5are outside. It turns out that increasing the number of either type leaves our result intact (see
Section 5). Finally—and this, to our mind, is the most salient difference—the economic
phenomena depicted in Baake et al. and here are different, indeed almost complementary.
In Baake et al., the issue is to ﬁgure out when a ﬁrm will outsource to its rival. Here we
consider precisely the opposite scenario and pinpoint conditions under which a ﬁrm will
turn away from its rival and outsource instead to an outsider, even if the outsider happens to
have a costlier technology.10 The fact that both models take cognizance of the endogenous
Stackelberg effect is a technical—albeit interesting—point. What is signiﬁcant is that this
effect is embedded in disparate models and utilized to explain complementary economic
phenomena.
The paper is organized as follows. We present the model in Section 2, stripped down to
its bare minimum, and with just three ﬁrms. The main result is stated in Section 3 and its
proof is in Section 4. In Section 5, we indicate how our result is robust to various extensions
of the model. Finally, in Section 6 we give an intuitive justiﬁcation for the presence of the
secrecy clause in the contract between ﬁrm J and ﬁrm O.
2 The Model
For ease of notation, we substitute 0, 1, 2 for O, I, J: As was said, ﬁrms 1 and 2 are
duopolists in the market for a ﬁnal good ®. An intermediate good ´ is required to produce
®: Firm 1 can manufacture ´, but 2 cannot. There is an “outside” ﬁrm 0 which can also
manufacture ´. What distinguishes 0 from 1 is that 0 cannot enter the market for the ﬁnal
good ®. Firm 0’s sole means of proﬁt is the manufacture of good ´ for the “inside” ﬁrms 1
and 2.
The inverse market demand for good ® is given by P = maxf0;a ¡ Qg, where Q
denotes the total quantity of ® produced by ﬁrms 1 and 2, and P denotes the price of ®. The
constant marginal cost of production of good ´ is c0 for 0 and c1 for 1. Furthermore both
1 and 2 can convert x units of good ´ into x units of good ® at the (for simplicity) same
constant marginal cost, which w.l.o.g we normalize to zero. We assume
0 < c1 < c0 < (a + c1)=2 (1)
The condition c1 < c0 gives a cost disadvantage to the outside ﬁrm 0 and loads the dice
against good ´ being sourced to it. The inequality c0 < (a + c1)=2 prevents 1 from auto-
matically becoming a monopolist in the market for good ®.
The extensive form game between the three ﬁrms is completely speciﬁed by the para-
meters c1, c0, a and so we shall denote it ¡(c0;c1;a). It is played as follows. For i 2 f0;1g
and j 2 f1;2g, put
qi
j ´ quantity of good ´ outsourced by ﬁrm j to ﬁrm i
10Our analysis thus suggests that the current widespread trend of outsourcing to offshore locations can well
persist for strategic reasons, even if offshore costs were to rise, so long as the offshore companies abstain from
the ﬁnal product markets of their clients.
6(and put q ´ fqi
jg
i=0;1
j=1;2). In the ﬁrst stage of the game, ﬁrms 0 and 1 simultaneously and
publicly announce prices p0 and p1 at which they are ready to provide good ´. Seeing
these prices, ﬁrm 2 then chooses q0
2;q1
2: Firm 1 observes q1
2 but not q0
2; since q0
2 is part
of the secret contract between 0 and 2. Finally11 ﬁrm 1, also knowing the prices, decides
how much q1
1 to produce on its own and how much q0




2 ¸ 0 so that it is able to honor its commitment to supply q1
2 units of ´
to 2. Denote x2(q) ´ q0
2 +q1
2: Thus x1(q) and x2(q) are the outputs produced by 1 and 2 in
the market ®:
It remains to describe the payoffs of the three ﬁrms at the terminal nodes of the game
tree. Any such node is speciﬁed by p ´ (p0;p1) and q = fqi
jg
i=0;1











¦2(p;q) = (a ¡ x1(q) ¡ x2(q))x2(q) ¡ p0q0
2 ¡ p1q1
2
This completes the description of the game ¡(c0;c1;a):
3 The Main Result
By an SPNE of ¡(c0;c1;a), we shall mean a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies of the game ¡(c0;c1;a):
Our main result asserts that, if the the cost disadvantage of the outside ﬁrm 0 is not too









and observe that (1) implies




Our result is summarized in Figure 1 below, in which c0 is varied on the horizontal axis,
holding a and c1 ﬁxed (and is even allowed to fall below c1).
Notice that the interval (c1;c¤) is of particular interest because here ﬁrm 0 has a cost dis-
advantage compared to ﬁrm 1, yet 2 outsources ´ to 0 rather than from 1. Strategic con-
siderations dominate ﬁrms’ behavior here. Below this interval, when c0 · c1, 0 has a cost
advantage over 1 and so 2 even more readily outsourced to 0; in fact, for small enough c0,
both 1 and 2 outsource to 0. We shall ignore this easy case where ﬁrm 0 becomes addition-
ally attractive on account of its lower cost. To keep strategic incentives in the foreground,
we shall suppose throughout that c0 > c1.
11We could have supposed that ﬁrm 1 must place its order with 0 before ﬁnding out the quantity q
1
2: This
would alter the game somewhat but not our conclusion (Theorem 1 in Section 3 will hold without any change).
But the timing that we have given seems more natural to us. There is a fundamental asymmetry of information
between ﬁrms 1 and 2. Firm 1 always has the option of waiting to see how much q
1
2 ﬁrm 2 will outsource to it
before approaching 0 to outsource its own q
1
0: In contrast, ﬁrm 2 can never know whether ﬁrm 1 has gone to 0
or not, so it cannot plan to wait until 1 has outsourced to 0 before placing its order with 1.
7Figure 1: The Outsourcing Pattern (j ! i ´ j outsources ´ exclusively to i)












and, for any interval [u;v] µ [c1;(a + c1)=2], deﬁne
(Graph ¿)[u;v] ´ f(p0;¿(p0))jp0 2 [u;v]g
and abbreviate
Graph ¿ ´ (Graph ¿)[c1;(a + c1)=2]
Since ¿(c1) > c1 and ¿((a + c1)=2) = (a + c1)=2, Graph ¿ is a straight line contained in
the square [c1;(a + c1)=2]2 (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: (Graph ¿)[u;v]
We are now ready to state our main result.
Theorem. (I) In any SPNE of ¡(c0;c1;a), ﬁrm 1 never outsources to ﬁrm 0, i:e:; q0
1 = 0:
8(II) If c0 2 (c1;c¤); there is a continuum of SPNE of ¡(c0;c1;a); indexed by supplier prices
(p0;p1) 2 (Graph ¿)[c0;c¤]; and; in every SPNE; ﬁrm 2 outsources ´ to the outside ﬁrm 0:
(III) If c0 2 (c¤;(a + c1)=2); there is a continuum of SPNE of ¡(c0;c1;a); indexed by
supplier prices (p0;p1) 2 (Graph ¿)[c1;c0]; and; in every SPNE; ﬁrm 2 outsources ´ to the
inside ﬁrm 1:
(IV) Finally; if c0 = c¤; there are two SPNE of ¡(c0;c1;a) with the same provider prices




Throughout the lemmas below, c1 and a are ﬁxed and (recall) c0 2 (c1;(a + c1)=2):
Lemma 1. In any SPNE of ¡(c0;c1;a); we must have p0 ¸ c1:
Proof. Suppose p0 < c1: Since c1 < c0 (by assumption, see (1)), ﬁrm 0 makes (p1¡c0) < 0
dollars per unit of the total outsourced order q0
1 + q0
2 that it receives. If it could be shown
that q0
1 + q0
2 > 0, there would be an immediate contradiction, because ﬁrm 0 can in fact
ensure zero payoff by deviating from p0 to some sufﬁciently high p0
0 (any p0
0 higher than the
maximum price a in market ® will do), at which price neither ﬁrm will outsource anything
to it.




2 = 0 (otherwise we are done). If 2 produces a positive amount, it must outsource
to 1, i.e., q1
2 > 0. Then, since p0 < c1, 1 will pass on this order to 0, i.e., q0
1 > 0.
If 2 produces nothing then, as is easily veriﬁed, ﬁrm 1 will make a positive sale of ®;
i.e., q0
1 +q1




1: Since p0 < c1; optimality
requires that q1
1 = 0, so we conclude that q0
1 > 0:
In view of Lemma 1, we will assume p0 ¸ c1 throughout the rest of this section.
Let G(p0;p1;q1
2) denote the subgame between 1 and 2, after (p0;p1) and q1
2 are an-







Denote z ´ q0
1 + q1
1: If p0 > c1 then, in order to produce z, it is a strictly dominant strategy
for ﬁrm 1 to set q0
1 = 0 and q1
1 = z (i.e., to produce all of z at the lower cost c1); if p0 = c1,
then ﬁrm 1 is indifferent on the split of z. In either case, ﬁrm 1 procures ´ at cost c1.
We may suppress ´ and think of G(p0;p1;q1
2) as a game involving only good ®, in which




2 at cost c1 and 2 produces q0
2 at cost p0; and in which
2 has an “endowment” q1
2 procured before entering the game at price p1: The payoffs of 1
and 2 in G(p0;p1;q1
2) are given by
¦1(x1;q0
2) = (a ¡ q1
2 ¡ x1 ¡ q0
2)x1 ¡ c1x1 + (p1 ¡ c1)q1
2
¦2(x1;q0
2) = (a ¡ q1








2, involving good ´, can be viewed as constants that are given
from the past, before the game G(p0;p1;q1
2) is played.)
Lemma 2. G(p0;p1;q1
2) has a unique NE:
Proof. Let (qC
1(p0);qC
2(p0)) denote the quantities of ﬁrms 1 and 2 in the unique NE of the





((a ¡ 2c1 + p0)=3;(a + c1 ¡ 2p0)=3) if p0 · (a + c1)=2
((a ¡ c1)=2;0) if p0 ¸ (a + c1)=2 (3)
Let [y]+ ´ maxf0;yg for any y 2 R. It is easy to check that the NE of G(p0;p1;q1
2) is
unique and, indeed as follows.
(i) if 0 · q1
2 · [qC
2(p0)]+, then 2 produces qC
2(p0) ¡ q1




2 · a ¡ c1, then 2 produces zero and 1 produces (a ¡ c1 ¡ q1
2)=2;
(iii) if q1
2 > a ¡ c1, then both produce zero.
Lemma 3. Suppose p0 ¸ (a+c1)=2. Then the NE of G(p0;p1;q1
2) is invariant of p0: Hence
w.l.o.g. we may restrict p0 · (a + c1)=2:
Proof. If p0 ¸ (a + c1)=2; then qC
2(p0) = 0 by (3) and then (from (i), (ii), (iii) in the proof
of Lemma 2) q0
2 = 0. Since c1 < (a + c1)=2; we have p0 > c1 and hence q0
1 = 0 as well.
So ﬁrm 0 receives no order from anyone when p0 ¸ (a + c1)=2. The lemma follows.
We now move one step back in the game tree of ¡(c0;c1;a) and denote by G(p0;p1) the
game that ensues after the simultaneous announcement of p0 and p1. In looking for SPNE
of G(p0;p1), it sufﬁces to consider the problem in which ﬁrm 2 chooses q1
2 and then the
unique NE of G(p0;p1;q1
2) is played.
First imagine two games between ﬁrms 1 and 2 in the market ®: In both games, the
inverse demand for ® is ﬁxed at P = maxf0;a ¡ Qg and the (constant, marginal) cost of
ﬁrm 1 (to produce ®) is ﬁxed at c1: The constant marginal cost c 2 [c1;(a + c1)=2] of ﬁrm
2 (to produce ®) is considered variable and hence the game depends on c: Let S21(c) be
the Stackelberg duopoly with 2 as the leader and 1 the follower and let C(c) be the Cournot
duopoly between 1 and 2. These games have unique SPNE.12 Let f(c) and `(c) denote the
proﬁts of 1 (follower) and 2 (leader) in the SPNE of S21(c). Let ·1(c) and ·2(c) denote the
corresponding proﬁts in C(c). Finally, let qS
1 (c) and qS
2 (c) denote the output produced by 1
and 2 in the SPNE of S21(c) (and recall qC
1(c) and qC
2(c) are the corresponding outputs in







(0;(a ¡ c)=2) if c · [2c1 ¡ a]+;
(0; a ¡ c1) if [2c1 ¡ a]+ · c · [(3c1 ¡ a)=2]+;
((a ¡ 3c1 + 2c)=4; (a + c1 ¡ 2c)=2) if [(3c1 ¡ a)=2]+ · c · (a + c1)=2;
((a ¡ c1)=2; 0) if c ¸ (a + c1)=2:
(4)
12In the Cournot game C(c), SPNE is just NE.
10Lemma 4 below characterizes the SPNE of G(p0;p1) as (p0;p1) varies. To state it, we
need to partition the price space [c1;(a + c1)=2] £ [0;1) of (p0;p1) into four regions RM,
RS, RC and Graph ¿ (see Figure 3). Recall that [y]+ ´ maxf0;yg for any y 2 R, and put
RM = f(p0;p1) 2 R2
+jc1 · p0 · (a + c1)=2;0 · p1 · [(3c1 ¡ a)=2]+g
RS = f(p0;p1) 2 R2
+jc1 · p0 · (a + c1)=2;[(3c1 ¡ a)=2]+ < p1 < ¿(p0)g
RC = f(p0;p1) 2 R2
+jc1 · p0 · (a + c1)=2;p1 > ¿(p0)g
Also, let us use the phrase “in SPNE” to mean “in the play induced by the SPNE”. We are
now ready to state Lemma 4.
Figure 3: SPNE of G(p0;p1)
Lemma4. (Figure3)Supposep0 · (a+c1)=2:Letx1(q) ´ q0
1+q1
1¡q1
2 andx2(q) ´ q0
2+q1
2
be the quantities sold by ﬁrms 1 and 2 in the market ®.
(i) In any SPNE of G(p0;p1); q0
2q1
2 = 0 and w.l.o.g. q0






11(ii) If (p0;p1) 2 RM; G(p0;p1) has a unique SPNE with q0
2 = 0; x2(q) = q1
2 > 0 and
x1(q) = 0. Firms 0; 1; 2 have zero, negative, positive payoffs respectively and ﬁrm 2 is a
monopolist:
(iii) If (p0;p1) 2 RS; G(p0;p1) has a unique SPNE in which q0
2 = 0 and the ensuing game
is S21(p1) where x2(q) = q1
2 = qS
2 (p1) and x1(q) = qS
1 (p1): Firms 0; 1 and 2 earn zero,
F(p1) ´ f(p1) + (p1 ¡ c1)qS
2 (p1) and `(p1) respectively:
(iv) If (p0;p1) 2 RC; G(p0;p1) has a unique SPNE in which q1
2 = 0 and the ensuing game
is C(p0) where x2(q) = q0
2 = qC
2(p0) and x1(q) = q1
1 = qC
1(p0). Firms 0; 1 and 2 earn
(p0 ¡ c0)qC
2(p0); ·1(p0) and ·2(p0) respectively:
(v) If (p0;p1) 2 Graph ¿; G(p0;p1) has exactly two SPNE. In the ﬁrst SPNE; q0
2 = 0
and the ensuing game is S21(p1) where x2(q) = q1
2 = qS
2 (p1) and x1(q) = qS
1 (p1); ﬁrms
0; 1 and 2 earn zero, F(p1) ´ f(p1) + (p1 ¡ c1)qS
2 (p0) and `(p1) respectively: In the
second SPNE; q1





1(p0); ﬁrms 0; 1 and 2 earn (p0¡c0)qC
2(p0); ·1(p0) and ·2(p0) respectively:
Proof. We ﬁrst argue that w.l.o.g. q0
1 = 0. Recall p0 ¸ c1: If p0 > c1, it is obvious that
q0
1 = 0. If p0 = c1, there is an irrelevant multiplicity of optimal choices for ﬁrm 1: it is
indifferent between all pairs (q0
1;q1
1) such that q0
1 + q1
1 is a given constant z. But no matter
how 1 breaks the tie, this has no effect on the rest of the game, i.e., on the choice (q0
2;q1
2) of
ﬁrm 2, or on the price of ®, or on the payoffs of 1 and 2. Thus we may take13q0
1 = 0 and
q1
1 = z.
The rest of the proof is again a matter of straightforward calculation. From (i), (ii), (iii)
in the proof of Lemma 2, we can compute the payoffs ¦i(p0;p1;q1
2) at the terminal node of
the game ¡(c0;c1;a) that is reached by the unique NE of the subgame G(p0;p1;q1
2). (Note
that ¦1 and ¦2 include the sunk cost p1q1
2 incurred by 2 and concomitant gain (p1¡c1)q1
2 of
1, prior to reaching the node (p0;p1;q1
2) in ¡.) These are as follows (recalling the Cournot
quantities qC







2(p0))2 + (p0 ¡ p1)q1
2 if 0 · q1
2 · qC
2(p0)




















1(p0))2 + (p1 ¡ c1)q1
2 if 0 · q1
2 · qC
2(p0)
(a ¡ c1 ¡ q1
2)2=4 + (p1 ¡ c1)q1
2 if qC
2(p0) < q1
2 · a ¡ c1
(p1 ¡ c1)q1
2 if q1
2 > a ¡ c1
(6)






+ of ﬁrm 1 may be partitioned into “equivalence










1 = zg. The game G(p0;p1), and in particular
the set of its SPNE, is unaffected by which element ﬁrm 1 picks in ¤(z). In other words, when p0 = c1, ﬁrm 1
may be viewed as choosing only z (and it is irrelevant which point in ¤(z) it actually picks to “effect” z).
Furthermore note that when we go a step back to the root of the tree ¡(c0;c1;a), it can in fact never happen
in any SPNE of ¡(c0;c1;a) that p0 = c1 and that q
0
1 > 0 (see Lemma 7).
12Next we move one step back in the game tree ¡ and consider the maximization problem












2 (p1)g if p1 < ¿(p0)
f0;qS
2 (p1)g if p1 = ¿(p0)
f0g if p1 > ¿(p0)
(7)
The lemma follows from (i), (ii), (iii) (in the proof of Lemma 2) and (7).
Lemma 5. Suppose p1 ¸ (a + c1)=2. Then the SPNE of G(p0;p1) are invariant of p1:
Hence w.l.o.g. we may restrict p1 · (a + c1)=2:
Proof. When p1 ¸ (a + c1)=2, we are in the region RC. So q1
2 = 0 by (iv) of Lemma 4,
proving the result.
Let us recall (from Lemma 4) the payoff F(p1) of ﬁrm 1, when 1 is the follower in
S21(p1) and charges p1 to ﬁrm 2, i.e., F(p1) ´ f(p1) + (p1 ¡ c1)qS
2 (p0).
Lemma 6. F is strictly increasing on [c1;(a + c1)=2].
Proof. Straightforward computation, using (4).
Lemma 7. In any SPNE of ¡(c0;c1;a); the following hold:
(i) p1 > [(3c1 ¡ a)=2]+








2 > 0; then (p0;p1) 2 (Graph ¿)[c1;c0]:
Proof. (i) Suppose p1 · [(3c1 ¡ a)=2]+: Then we are in the region RM and, by (ii) of
Lemma 4 (see Figure 3) q1
2 > 0: Since 0 < c1 < a (by (1)), we have [(3c1 ¡ a)=2]+ < c1
and so p1 < c1. Thus ﬁrm 1’s payoff is (p1 ¡ c1)q1
1 < 0: But 1 can deviate and set a
sufﬁciently high price (any price above a will do) to ensure that ﬁrm 2 does not outsource
to it, and thus 1 can earn a non-negative payoff, a contradiction.
(ii) By Lemma 3, we may suppose p0 · (a+c1)=2. So if the claim is false, p0 = (a+c1)=2.
By Lemma 5 and (i) above, p1 2 ([(3c1 ¡ a)=2]+;(a + c1)=2]: If p1 < (a + c1)=2, then
(p0;p1) 2 RS and so, by (iii) of Lemma 4, ﬁrm 1 gets payoff F(p1). Since F is strictly
increasing, we must have p1 = (a+c1)=2 (otherwise 1 can improve its payoff by increasing
p1). We conclude that p0 = p1 = (a + c1)=2: Then (p0;p1) 2 Graph ¿ and, by (v) of
Lemma 4, there are two possible SPNE of G(p0;p1). No matter which prevails, q0
2 = 0 (by
(3) and (4)) and hence ﬁrm 0 gets zero payoff. Let 0 deviate by changing p0 to p0
0 where
c0 < p0
0 < (a+c1)=2: But (p0
0;p1) 2 RC and q0
2 > 0 (by Lemma 4 and (3)), so ﬁrm 0 earns
positive payoff as a result of the deviation, a contradiction.
13(iii) Denote I0 ´ [c1;(a + c1)=2) and I1 ´ ([(3c1 ¡ a)=2]+;(a + c1)=2]: Then we have
(p0;p1) 2 I0 £ I1 by Lemma 5 and (i) and (ii) above.
First consider p1 = (a + c1)=2. Then (p0;p1) 2 RC for any p0 2 I0 and in any SPNE
of G(p0;p1), we have q0
2 = qC
2(p0) by Lemma 4. Since qC
2(p0) > 0 for p0 2 I0 (by (3)), we
have q0
2 > 0:
Next consider p1 2 I1nf(a + c1)=2g. Then it follows from Lemma 4 that in any SPNE
of G(p0;p1), q0
2 + q1
2 equals either qC
2(p0) or qS
2 (p1). Since qC
2p0) > 0 for p0 2 I0 (by (3))
and qS
2 (p1) > 0 for p1 2 I1nf(a + c1)=2g (by (4)), the result follows.
(iv) When p0 < c0; ﬁrm 0 gets (p0¡c0) < 0 dollars for every unit that is outsourced to it. If
q0
1 + q0
2 > 0; then 0 gets negative payoff. But 0 can deviate and set a sufﬁciently high price
to ensure that no ﬁrm outsources to it and 0 can thus guarantee zero payoff, a contradiction.
(v) By (i) and (ii) above and by Lemma 5, c1 · p0 < (a + c1)=2 and [(3c1 ¡ a)=2]+ <
p1 · (a + c1)=2. But then, by Lemma 4, q1
2 > 0 implies (p0;p1) 2 [RS [ Graph ¿]: If
(p0;p1) 2 RS, i.e., p1 < ¿(p0), then (again by Lemma 4) ﬁrm 1 earns F(p1). Since F is
strictly increasing (by Lemma 6), 1 can improve its payoff by raising its price to p1 + " <
¿(p0); a contradiction. This proves (p0;p1) 2 Graph ¿:
It remains to show that p0 · c0: Suppose p0 > c0: Then since c0 > c1 by assumption,
we have p0 > c1 which immediately implies that q0
1 = 0: Since q1
2 > 0; we also have
q0
2 = 0 by (i) of Lemma 4. So ﬁrm 0 gets no order and earns zero payoff. Let ﬁrm 0
reduce p0 to p0 ¡ " > c0. Since (p0;p1) 2 Graph ¿ as shown in the previous paragraph,
(p0 ¡ ";p1) 2 RC (see Figure 3) and so ﬁrm 2 will outsource a positive amount to 0 after
0’s deviation (by Lemma 4 and (3)). Thus 0 earns a positive payoff after its deviation, a
contradiction.
Recall the Stackelberg and Cournot duopoly games, S21(c) and C(c) in which the cost
of ﬁrm 1 is ﬁxed at c1 while that of its rival ﬁrm 2 is a variable c. The function ·1(c)
simply gives the standard Cournot proﬁt of ﬁrm 1. In contrast, F(c) = f(c)+(c¡c1)qS
2 (c)
lumps together the proﬁt f(c) that 1 makes as the follower in S21(c) as well as the revenue
(c ¡ c1)qS
2 (c) that 1 earns by supplying 2 its Stackelberg-leader output qS
2 (c) at price c.
The following lemma compares F and ·1: First deﬁne
~ c = 55c1=62 + 7a=62 (8)
and observe that c1 < ~ c < (a + c1)=2 by (1).
Lemma 8. (Figure 4) ·1 is strictly increasing on [c1;(a + c1)=2]: Moreover; F < ·1 on
[c1;~ c); F > ·1 on (~ c;(a + c1)=2); F(~ c) = ·1(~ c) and F((a + c1)=2) = ·1((a + c1)=2):
Proof. Straightforward computation using the explicit formulae for ·1 and F that follow
from (3) and (4).
For any c; we shall deﬁne ¸(c) to be the minimum cost of ﬁrm 2 at which 1 is willing to
switch from the Cournot game C(c) to being follower in the Stackelberg game S21(¸(c)):
Precisely
¸ : [0;~ c] ! [0;~ c]
14Figure 4: The Functions ·1 and F
is given by
¸ ´ F¡1 ± ·1:
The function ¸ is well-deﬁned, strictly increasing and ¸(~ c) = ~ c:
Lemma 9. (Figure 5) Let c 2 [c1;~ c]: Then ·1(c) = F(¸(c)), F(y) < ·1(c2) for y < ¸(c)
and F(y) > ·1(c) for y > ¸(c):
Proof. The proof follows from lemmas 6, 8 and the deﬁnition of ¸.
Figure 5: The Function ¸
The next lemma compares the functions ¿ and ¸. Deﬁne
c¤ = 13c1=14 + a=14 (9)
and observe from (1) and (8) that
c1 < c¤ < ~ c: (10)
15Lemma 10. (Figure 6) Let c 2 [c1;~ c]: Then ¸(c¤) = ¿(c¤); ¿(c) < ¸(c) for c 2 [c1;c¤),
¿(c) > ¸(c) for c2 2 (c¤;~ c]:
Proof. Straightforward computation using the explicit formula for ¿ in (2) and the explicit
formulae for ·1 and F that follow from (3) and (4).
Figure 6: ¿(p0) and ¸(p0)
Lemma 11. (p0 ¡ c0)qC
2(p0) is increasing in p0 for p0 2 [c1;~ c]:
Proof. A simple calculation shows that (p0 ¡ c0)qC
2(p0) = (p0 ¡ c0)(a + c1 ¡ 2p0)=3 for
p0 2 [c1;(a + c1)=2] from which the result follows.
Lemma 12. In any SPNE of ¡(c0;c1;a); if q0
2 > 0; then (p0;p1) 2 (Graph¿)[c1;c¤]:
Proof. In step 1 we show that p0 2 [c1;c¤] and in step 2 we show that p1 = ¿(p0):
Step 1: By Lemma 1, we have p0 ¸ c1. So it sufﬁces to show that p0 · c¤:
Since q0
2 > 0 we have, by (iv) and (v) of Lemma 4, that (p0;p1) 2 [RC [ Graph ¿] and
that the payoff of ﬁrm 1 is ·1(p0). In what follows, we show that if p0 > c¤, ﬁrm 1 can earn
more than ·1(p0) by setting a price p0
1 < ¿(p0), a contradiction establishing step 1.
Recall from (10) that c1 < c¤ < ~ c. First suppose that ~ c · p0 < (a + c1)=2: By (ii) of
Lemma 7, we must have p0 < (a + c1)=2. Let ﬁrm 1 change p1 to p0
1 ´ ¿(p0) ¡ " > 0:
Then (p0;p0
1) 2 RS and, by (iii) of Lemma 4, 1’s payoff is F(p0
1): Since ¿(p0) > p0 for
p0 < (a + c1)=2; we have p0
1 > p0 for small enough ", implying that F(p0
1) > F(p0)
(since F is strictly increasing—see Lemma 6). Since p0 ¸ ~ c, it follows from Lemma 8 that
F(p0) ¸ ·1(p0). Hence F(p0
1) > ·1(p0), showing that ﬁrm 1 has made a gainful deviation,
a contradiction. So we must have p0 < ~ c.
Now suppose that c¤ < p0 < ~ c. Then ¸(p0) < ¿(p0) by Lemma 10. Let ﬁrm 1
change p1 to p0
1 ´ ¸(p0) + " where " is small enough to ensure that ¸(p0) + " < ¿(p0).
Then (p0;p0
1) 2 RS and 1 gets the payoff F(p0
1) (by (iii) of Lemma 4). Since F is strictly
increasing, F(p0
1) > F(¸(p0)). By the deﬁnition of ¸, we have F(¸(p0)) = ·1(p0): Hence
16F(p0
1) > ·1(p0), showing that ﬁrm 1 has made a gainful deviation, a contradiction. This
proves that p0 2 [c1;c¤]:
Step 2: Since q0
2 > 0, we must have (p0;p1) 2 [RC [ Graph ¿] and the payoff of ﬁrm 0 is
(p0 ¡ c0)qC
2(p0) (by (iv) and (v) of Lemma 4).
By Lemma 5, we may suppose that p1 · (a + c1)=2: We have already shown that
p0 2 [c1;c¤]: Since c¤ < (a + c1)=2, we have ¿(p0) < (a + c1)=2: If (p0;p1) 2 RC, then
p1 2 (¿(p0);(a+c1)=2]: Let 0 deviate and set a price p0
0 ´ p0+" < ~ c where " is sufﬁciently
small to ensure that p0
0 < ~ c and p1 > ¿(p0
0). Then (p0









2(p0). This shows that when (p0;p1) 2 RC, ﬁrm 0 can make a gainful deviation.
Hence we must have (p0;p1) 2 Graph ¿ which, together with p0 2 [c1;c¤], proves that
(p0;p1) 2 (Graph ¿)[c1;c¤]:
4.2 Proof of the Theorem
Proof of (I) This has been proved as (i) of Lemma 4 and (iv) if Lemma 7.
Proof of (II) Consider c0 < c¤: First we show that q1
2 = 0 in any SPNE. For if q1
2 > 0; we
must have (p0;p1) 2 (Graph ¿)[c1;c0] by (v) of Lemma 7. Then p1 = ¿(p0) < (a + c1)=2
and, by (v) of Lemma 4, ﬁrm 1 gets payoff F(p1) = F(¿(p0)): Let 1 deviate and choose
p0
1 2 (¿(p0);(a+c1)=2]: Then (p0;p0
1) 2 RC and, by (iv) of Lemma 4, 1 gets payoff ·1(p0).
Since p0 · c0 < c¤; Lemma 10 implies that ¿(p0) < ¸(p0). By the strict monotonicity of
F (Lemma 6), it follows that F(¿(p0)) < F(¸(p0)). By the deﬁnition of ¸, F(¸(p0)) =
·1(p0): Since F(p1) = F(¿(p0)); we conclude that ·1(p0) > F(p1), showing that ﬁrm 1
has improved after the deviation, a contradiction.
By (iii) of Lemma 7, q0
2 +q1
2 > 0: We have just shown that q1
2 = 0. Hence we must have
q0
2 > 0 in any SPNE. Then it follows from Lemma 12 that (p0;p1) 2 (Graph ¿)[c1;c¤] in
any SPNE. By (iv) of Lemma 7, we must have p0 ¸ c0. Since c0 < c¤, the interval [c0;c¤]
is non-empty, hence (p0;p1) 2 (Graph ¿)[c0;c¤].
It remains to show that for any (p0;p1) 2 (Graph ¿)[c0;c¤] we do get an SPNE with
q0
2 > 0.
First consider ﬁrm 2. Since (p0;p1) 2 Graph ¿ we see (by (v) of Lemma 4) that ﬁrm 2
has exactly two optimal choices, which involve exclusive orders from either 0 or 1. Since it
is already choosing the former, it cannot proﬁt by a unilateral deviation.
Next consider ﬁrm 0. Its payoff is (p0¡c0)qC
2(p0), which is non-negative since p0 ¸ c0.
But (p0;p1) 2 Graph ¿, i.e., p1 = ¿(p0). If 0 reduces its price from p0 to p0
0 < c1, then
(since c1 < c0), 0 gets at most zero payoff. If 0 reduces its price from p0 to p0
0 ¸ c1,
then ¿(p0




0). Observe that (p0
0 ¡ c0)qC
2(p0
0) < (p0 ¡ c0)qC
2(p0) (by Lemma 11 and the
fact that c¤ < ~ c), so again the deviation is not gainful. If 0 increases its price from p0 to p0
0,
then ¿(p0
0) > ¿(p0) = p1 and (p0;p1) 2 RS: Then, by (iii) of Lemma 4, 0 gets zero payoff,
again gaining nothing.
Finally consider ﬁrm 1. Its payoff is ·1(p0). Recall that p1 = ¿(p0). If 1 raises its price
17to p0
1 > p1 = ¿(p0), then (p0;p0
1) 2 RC and, by (iv) of Lemma 4, 1 will still get ·1(p0).
If 1 lowers its price to p0
1 < p1 = ¿(p0), then (p0;p0
1) 2 RS and, by (iii) of Lemma 4,
1 will get F(p0
1): By the strict monotonicity of F, we have F(p0
1) < F(p1) = F(¿(p0)).
Since p0 · c¤; we have ¿(p0) · ¸(p0) (Lemma 10), so that F(¿(p0)) · F(¸(p0)). By the
deﬁnition of ¸, F(¸(p0)) = ·1(p0). Hence we conclude that F(p0
1) < ·1(p0); showing that
1 cannot improve by any unilateral deviation. This completes the proof of part (II).
Proof of (III) Consider c¤ < c0 < (a + c1)=2. If q0
2 > 0, then (a) p0 ¸ c0 (by (iv) of
Lemma 7) and (b) p0 · c¤ (by Lemma 12). Since c¤ < c0, both (a) and (b) cannot hold. So
we must have q0
2 = 0. Since q0
2 + q1
2 > 0 (by (iii) of Lemma 7), we conclude that q1
2 > 0.
Then, by (v) of Lemma 7, it follows that (p0;p1) 2 (Graph ¿)[c1;c0]:
It remains to show that for any (p0;p1) 2 (Graph ¿)[c1;c0] we do get an SPNE with
q0
2 > 0.
First consider ﬁrm 2. We can argue exactly as in the proof of (I) that it cannot make a
gainful unilateral deviation.
Next consider ﬁrm 0. Its payoff is zero. Since p0 2 [c1;c0], by lowering its price to
p0
0 < p0 · c0, it can get at most zero payoff. Since (p0;p1) 2 Graph ¿, p1 = ¿(p0). If 0 it
raises its price to p0
0 > p0, then ¿(p0
0) > ¿(p0) = p1. Hence (p0
0;p1) 2 RS and, by (iii) of
Lemma 4, 0 continues to get zero payoff.
Finally consider ﬁrm 1. Its payoff is F(p1) = F(¿(p0)). If 1 lowers its price to p0
1 <
p1 = ¿(p0), then (p0;p0
1) 2 RS and, by (iii) of Lemma 4, 1 gets F(p0
1): By the monotonicity
of F, F(p0
1) < F(p1) and so 1 does not proﬁt. If 1 raises its price to p0
1 > p1 = ¿(p0), then
(p0;p0
1) 2 RC and, by (iv) of Lemma 4, 1 gets ·1(p0): Consider two cases. If p0 ¸ ~ c; we
have F(p0) ¸ ·1(p0) by Lemma 8. Since p0 < (a+c1)=2, we have ¿(p0) > p0 (see Figure
2) so that F(¿(p0)) > F(p0). Hence F(¿(p0)) > ·1(p0), so 1 does not gain. If p0 < ~ c,
we have ¿(p0) > ¸(p0) by Lemma 10, so F(¿(p0)) > F(¸(p0)). By the deﬁnition of ¸,
F(¸(p0)) = ·1(p0) and we have F(¿(p0)) > ·1(p0), so once again 1 does not gain. This
completes the proof of part (III).
Proof of (IV). The argument is as in parts (II) and (III), hence omitted.
5 Variations of the model
Our model can be varied in many ways, but the essential theme remains intact: if O’s costs
are not much higher than I’s, J will outsource to O: The overall analysis follows the outline
of the proof of Theorem 1, but the details can get more complicated, and we omit them here.
5.1 Economies of scale
Keeping the rest of the model ﬁxed as before, now suppose that there are increasing, instead
of constant, returns to scale in the manufacture of the intermediate good ´; i.e., the average
cost ci(q) of manufacturing q units of ´ falls (as q rises) for both i = 0;1: For simplicity,
18suppose ci(q) falls linearly and that c0(q) = ¸c1(q) for some positive scalar14 ¸. It can then
be shown that there exists a threshold ¸¤ > 1 such that if ¸ < ¸¤:
(i) ﬁrm 2 outsources to ﬁrm 0 in any SPNE,
(ii) both ﬁrms 1 and 2 outsource to ﬁrm 0 in any SPNE when economies of scale are not too
small.
This result is established in Chen and Dubey (2005). (We already gave the intuition for it in
the introduction.)15
5.2 Multiple ﬁrms of each type
Suppose there are n0; n1; n2 replicas of ﬁrms 0, 1, 2. The timing of moves is assumed to be
as before, with the understanding that all replicas of a ﬁrm move simultaneously wherever
that ﬁrm had moved in the original game. Restricting attention to type-symmetric SPNE,
Theorem 1 again remains intact with a lower threshold.
5.3 Only Outside Suppliers
The strategic incentives that we have analyzed can arise in other contexts. Suppose, for in-
stance, that 1 and 2 both need to outsource the supply of the intermediate good ´ to outsiders
O = fO1;O2;:::g. If 2 goes ﬁrst to O and 1 knows which Oi has received 2’s order, then
1 will have incentive to outsource to some Oj that is distinct from Oi, even if Oj’s costs are
higher than Oi’s, so long as they are not much higher. For if 1 went to Oi, it might have
to infer the size of 2’s orders and thus be obliged to become a Stackelberg follower (e.g.,
because Oi has limited capacity and can attend to 1’s order only after fully servicing the
prior order of 2). Alternatively, even if 1 does not know who 2 has outsourced to, or indeed
if 2 has outsourced at all, it may be safer for 1 to spread its order among several ﬁrms in O
so that it minimizes the probability of becoming 2’s follower. We leave the precise modeling
and analysis of such situations for future research.
6 The Secrecy Clause
It is crucial to our analysis that the quantity outsourced by 2 to 0 cannot be observed by
1. This is not an unrealistic assumption. Many contracts, in practice, do incorporate a
conﬁdentiality or secrecy clause (see, e.g., Ravenhill, 2003; Clarkslegal and Kochhar, 2005).
But the secrecy clause can often be deduced to hold endogenously in equilibrium (in
appropriately “enlarged” games).
14Thus c1(q) = maxf0;c ¡ bqg and c0(q) = ¸maxf0;c ¡ bqg for positive scalars b; c, ¸.
15It is needed here that the economies of scale be not too pronounced, otherwise pure strategy SPNE may fail
to exist. More precisely, for the average cost function c1(q) =maxf0;c ¡bqg, it is assumed that 0 < b < c=2a
toguarantee(i)theexistenceofpurestrategySPNEand(ii)inequilibrium, thequantityproducedentailspositive
marginal cost.
19Indeed suppose that the quantity q outsourced by 2 to 0 can be made “public” (and hence
observable by 1) or else kept “secret” between 2 and 0. We argue that a public contract
can never occur (be active) at an SPNE, as long as the game provides sufﬁcient “strategic
freedom” to its various players. For suppose it did occur : 1 knew that 2 buys q units of
´ from 0 at price p0. Thus 1 is a Stackelberg follower in the ﬁnal market ®, regardless of
whom 2 chooses to outsource ´ to. It would be better for 1 to quote a lower pricep0¡" for ´.
This would be certain to lure 2 to outsource to 1. But p0 ¸ c0, since 0 could not be making
losses at the presumed SPNE; hence p0 ¡ " > c1 for small enough " (recall c0 > c1). By
manoeuvering 2’s order to itself, ﬁrm 1 thus earns a signiﬁcant proﬁt on the manufacture of
´. It does lose a little on the market for ®, because 2 has a lower cost p0 ¡" of ´ (compared
to the p0 earlier), but the loss is of the order of ". Thus 1 has made a proﬁtable unilateral
deviation, contradicting that we were at an SPNE.
Note that our argument relies on the fact that 1 has the strategic freedom to “counter”
the public contract. If, furthermore, 0 also has the freedom to reject the public contract and
counter it with a secret contract, then—foreseeing the above deviation by ﬁrm 1—ﬁrm 0
will only opt for secret contracts.
The most simple instance of such an enlarged game is obtained by inserting an initial
binary move by 0 at the start of our game ¡. This represents a declaration by 0 as to whether
its offer to 2 is by way of a public or a secret contract. The game ¡ follows 0’s declaration.
It is easy to verify that any SPNE of the enlarged game must have 0 choosing “secret”,
followed by an SPNE of ¡. Of course, more complicated enlarged games can be thought of.
For example, after the simultaneous announcement of p0 and p1 in our game ¡, suppose ﬁrm
2 has the option to choose “Public q” or ”Secret q” in the event that it goes to 0, followed by
“Accept” or “Reject” by 0. Clearly 1 ﬁnds out q only if “Public q” and “Accept” are chosen.
On the other hand, if 0 chooses “Reject” we (still having to complete the deﬁnition of the
enlarged game) could suppose that 2’s order of ´ is automatically directed to 1. This game
is more complex to analyze, but our argument above still applies and shows that a public
contract will never be played out in any SPNE.
We thus see that the secrecy clause can often emerge endogenously from strategic con-
siderations, even though—for simplicity—we postulated it in our model. It has been pointed
out already by Clarkslegal and Kochhar that the ﬁrm placing orders (ﬁrm 2 in our model)
may demand secrecy in order to protect sensitive information from leaking out to its rivals
and destroying its competitive advantage. Our analysis reveals that the ﬁrm taking the or-
ders (i.e., ﬁrm 0) may also—for more subtle strategic reasons—have a vested interest in
maintaining the secrecy clause.
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